



This report is the third annual report by the
European Advisory Group at CESifo. It includes
five chapters, each addressing a set of emerging pol-
icy issues in the euro area and in the European
Union as a whole. The executive summary provides
a brief synopsis of the report and presents the main
conclusions of the group as regards both analysis and
policy proposals.
The first chapter discusses the current economic situ-
ation and the future outlook for Europe stressing the
cause and implications of a strong euro as well as the
need for a common fiscal framework through an
improvement of the Stability and Growth Pact.
The second chapter discusses the political constraints
that prevent governments from implementing labour
market reforms and identifies factors and conditions
that, in the current situations could soften political
opposition. In addition, it analyses alternative poli-
cies that are effective in reducing unemployment,
while encountering much less opposition than labour
market reforms.
The  third chapter analyses current pay-setting
arrangements in Europe as well as the prospect of
reform. It reviews the positive experience of many
small European countries that have achieved real
wage moderation through co-ordinated collective
bargaining as well as the experience of countries
where the achievements of collective bargaining are
arguably much less positive.In either case,European
countries would benefit from more diversity in rela-
tive wages.
The fourth chapter reviews some aspects of the new
draft constitution for the European Union, pointing
to possible undesirable consequences from including
non-discrimination as a general rule in the European
constitution.
The fifth chapter presents a “primer” on the ten new
members of the EU starting in May 2004. It sum-
marises the income and structural differences
between them and the old members of the EU and
analyses a number of economic policy issues regard-
ing growth, migration, public finances, trade, foreign
direct investment and capital mobility.
The sixth chapter discusses the challenge to macro-
economic stabilisation in the ten new members of
the EU during the convergence process posed by lib-
eralised capital markets.The focus is on financial and
currency fragility created by dangerously high
volatility of capital flows and possible policies to
reduce macroeconomic vulnerability to a crisis.
The findings in brief
While growth in Europe was disappointing in 2003,
there are indicators that point to a moderate recov-
ery in 2004. The first chapter of our report presents
our forecasts and a discussion of the macroeconomic
outlook. In our forecasts, European GDP will grow
at a rate as high as 2 percent in 2004, once again lag-
ging significantly behind the United States.The glob-
al macroeconomic imbalances imply a risk of further
dollar depreciation, undercutting European growth
and potentially creating tensions about the appropri-
ate fiscal and monetary policy mix in the euro area.
The failure of the Ecofin Council to enforce the fis-
cal rules in the Treaty and in the Stability and
Growth Pact in November 2002 has already created
a discrepancy between the legal rules and their
application.This implies a dangerous vacuum. In the
2003 EEAG report we presented a proposal aimed
at improving the Stability and Growth Pact which
links the size of maximum budget deficits to the
stock of public debt.The proposal also aims at reduc-
ing political conflicts of interest in the enforcement
of the new improved rules by moving these decisions
to the European Court of Justice. Better fiscal rules
can prevent the current institutional crisis from
depriving Europe of a much needed common fiscal
framework.Because of political constraints, the margin of
manoeuvre for governments to combat unemploy-
ment with radical labour market reforms is typically
quite narrow. The second chapter identifies a set of
policies to reduce unemployment that would
encounter much less political opposition. These
include liberalising product markets; introducing a
simple “firing tax” that would be paid to the worker
as severance payment instead of the current system
of legal procedures; replacing welfare payments for
the poor with in-work benefits such as earned-
income tax credits (a proposal was formulated in the
2002 EEAG report); and ensuring that the search
activity of the unemployed be tightly monitored,
with sanctions in the form of reduced benefits if
search is not active.
But, as shown by the United Kingdom, Spain and
more recently Germany, a severe crisis and a sense
of urgency can help to implement reforms that
would otherwise be politically doomed. A critical
point has been reached in a number of European
countries, not so much because of overall macroeco-
nomic performance (the current slowdown is milder
than the previous one), but because of budgetary
problems (including the adverse consequences of
labour market rigidities for the financing of valuable
benefits such as pensions and health care as well as
for long-run living standards) and the feeling that
“globalisation” is making the burden of labour
rigidities unbearable.This is somehow “good news”,
but also “bad news” in the sense that the expected
economic recovery may cause governments to
diminish their reform efforts. This would be regret-
table, since a recovery would make the immediate
costs of reform much easier to bear.
An important dimension of labour market reform
concerns pay-setting arrangements, which have sig-
nificant implications for both macroeconomic per-
formance (by affecting the level of real wages) and
economic efficiency (by defining incentives for
achieving higher productivity). The third chapter
analyses current pay-setting arrangements in Europe
as well as the prospect of reform.A main conclusion
is that most Western European countries would ben-
efit from more diversity in relative wages. This
applies to small European countries that have
achieved real wage moderation at the aggregate
level through highly co-ordinated collective bargain-
ing as well as to a country like Germany where
wages are determined at the sectoral level.Acceding
countries are advised to stick to their current
(Anglo-Saxon type) systems of industrial relations,
with limited importance for collective bargaining
and decentralised bargaining at the level of the indi-
vidual firm if such collective bargaining does take
place. Pay-setting systems are very slow to change: it
takes a very long time or extraordinary circum-
stances to achieve radical changes. Therefore, spe-
cific recommendations for individual countries, that
are to have an effect in the medium term, must be
limited to improvements of the existing bargaining
systems, which for historical reasons may differ fun-
damentally among countries.
In the fourth chapter we review some aspects of the
new draft constitution for the European Union.It is,
we believe,not the intention of the European Union
to give to its courts the policy-making vote that the
Supreme Court of the United States has assumed.
But the assertion of ‘non-discrimination’ as a funda-
mental European value to be written into the con-
stitution invites this very consequence. We fully
share the objectives of those who argue for mea-
sures against discrimination: the elimination of
racism, the advancement of women in public and
business life, greater support for disabled people,
and the establishment of a true common market in
which national origin ceases to be of economic rele-
vance. Yet there is a danger that the necessarily
pragmatic pursuit of policies to achieve these objec-
tives will be overtaken by the semantic interpreta-
tion of exactly what constitutes discrimination and
non-discrimination if non-discrimination were to be
included as a general rule in the European constitu-
tion. Some forms of “discrimination” are in fact
essential in a well-functioning society. For instance,
without statistical discrimination for insurance pur-
poses, asymmetric information between economic
agents would make many important insurance mar-
kets disappear, with possibly high costs in terms of
general welfare.Similarly,in our proposal of welfare
state reform included in the 2003 EEAG report, we
stress that delayed integration of new foreign work-




an undue scaling back of the welfare state, which
would be damaging for both national and foreign
workers.
What should European citizens expect from the
accession of ten new members in the EU in May
2004? The fifth chapter of the report presents a
“primer” on acceding countries, summarising the
income and structural differences between the new
and the old members of the EU and analysing a
number of economic policy issues regarding growth,
migration, public finances, trade, foreign direct
investment and capital mobility. Our analysis
emphasises that convergence of the new countries’
income to the EU average will be a very long
process with considerable uncertainty about modal-
ities and possible structural and policy problems
emerging along the way. This conclusion counters
the widespread view that problems in acceding
countries are quite minor because convergence will
be relatively quick. The few examples of rapid and
successful convergence, such as Ireland, are the
exception rather than the rule. Large-scale migra-
tion, unemployment, financial instability and fiscal
imbalances will prevail for some time.Existing stud-
ies tend to downplay the importance of the impact
of accession on the current EU member states,
stressing that the main effects are likely to be felt at
the sectoral and/or regional level. But the uncer-
tainty surrounding the economic and policy prob-
lems in the post-accession phase is enormous.If any-
thing, the large differences in the rate of return of
capital in acceding countries and the rest of the EU
suggest that the implications of accession for
Western European countries are larger than sug-
gested by the weight of acceding countries’ GDP in
total EU GDP. Migration and trade can substantial-
ly influence the current problems in the labour mar-
kets and of the welfare states in most current EU
countries.A major problem will be the decline in the
wages of low-skilled workers in the current EU
countries. Ultimately, this decline is associated with
gains from trade in the enlarged EU area: ideally it
should result from a smooth and rapid structural
adjustment process. But a wage decline cannot easi-
ly be administered with the present pay-setting insti-
tutions, especially in countries where the welfare
system pays high replacement incomes. We there-
fore fear that the transition will be unnecessarily dif-
ficult for some of the existing EU economies, unless
they find effective and socially acceptable ways to
reform their institutions, so as to allow for the nec-
essary wage flexibility in the near future (our pro-
posals are discussed in Chapter 2 of this report as
well as in the 2002 EEAG report).
How soon should acceding countries enter the
EMU? The sixth chapter of the report reconsiders
the challenge to macroeconomic stabilisation during
the convergence process posed by liberalised capital
markets. A number of factors inherently linked to
convergence are likely to create financial and cur-
rency fragility and lead to dangerously high volatili-
ty of capital flows. There is no single strategy that
could be recommended to all acceding countries as
regards macroeconomic stabilisation on the road to
the euro. Countries that are already able to sustain
hard pegs (mostly small countries) should be helped
to achieve a smooth and fast transition to the euro.
Delaying participation in ERM II is instead a realis-
tic option for countries that are currently unable to
sustain such hard pegs.Here the policy priority is the
reduction of domestic imbalances, achieving a sus-
tainable fiscal stance and stabilising inflation at the
correct relative prices. For both groups of countries,
the convergence criteria in terms of inflation, inter-
est rates, debt and deficits provide desirable targets
to guide policy and should not be relaxed. Once
countries enter ERM II, the risk of crisis is some-
what reduced,but not eliminated,by letting acceding
countries make full use of the 15 percent bilateral
exchange rate bands.
The findings by chapter
The European economy: Current situation and 
economic outlook (Chapter 1)
In 2003, the European economy was close to stagna-
tion. With real GDP growth of only 1/2 percent, the
euro area was the least dynamic region of the indus-
trial world. Despite further easing of monetary
policy,domestic demand remained weak and exports
declined, reflecting low growth in world trade and
the strengthening of the euro.After stagnation in the
first half of 2003, output in the euro area increasedagain in the second half, and business confidence
also recovered. In 2004, the European economy is
expected to recover with growth in the euro area
amounting to 2 percent. This will, however, not be
strong enough to reduce unemployment. This fore-
cast is built on the assumption of a continued upturn
in the world economy, leading to a turnaround in
exports and investment. But the upturn remains
fragile as it depends to a large extent on external fac-
tors.As external imbalances continue to widen – the
US current account deficit is expected to increase to
above 5 percent of GDP – there is a risk of a contin-
ued weakening of the US dollar and a further appre-
ciation of the euro. While this would reduce import
prices and support real incomes in the euro area, it
could become a major obstacle to an export-led
recovery in Europe.
How weak will the dollar become in the next few
months? There is no sensible answer to this question,
as it is well known that exchange rates in the short to
medium term are well approximated by a random
walk.But history reminds us that,at the current euro
parity, the value of the D-mark fluctuated between
(approximately) 0.60 and 1.40 dollars per euro. The
value of the Japanese yen fluctuated in the range of
80-140 yen per dollar. It is not unreasonable to
expect similarly wide ranges to be relevant also for
the euro-dollar exchange rate.
The strong dollar in the initial phase of the euro
was arguably good news for EMU. As noted by
many observers, in the 1980s and 1990s, some cur-
rencies in Europe (for example, the Italian lira)
would strengthen vis-à-vis the D-mark when the
dollar was strong and weaken otherwise. This view
is dubbed “dollar-D-mark polarisation”. By reduc-
ing the tensions in the exchange markets for say,the
Italian lira, the Spanish peseta, and the Portuguese
escudo,a strong dollar arguably strengthened cohe-
sion in the EU before the introduction of the euro.
But there is also the other side of the coin to con-
sider. In a situation of a weakening dollar, different
countries experience different problems.Before the
introduction of the euro, these led to exchange rate
pressures. The European currency crisis in
September 1992 followed a “dollar crisis”culminat-
ing in August that year.Many of the realignments in
the Exchange Rate Mechanism of the European
Monetary System were preceded by dollar swings.
What would be the reaction within the euro area to
a further sharp fall of the dollar? Have the factors
underlying the dollar-D-mark polarisation disap-
peared with the single currency or are they still
active, potentially affecting real and financial mar-
kets? If they have not disappeared, they are likely
to bring about conflicts over the common monetary
policy and over fiscal policy in the various euro-
area countries.
There could soon be a need for further interest rate
cuts or a need to keep interest rates at the current
level, even if (as widely anticipated) the US Fed
alters its stance in 2004. In the past, the ECB has
been much less active than the Fed in changing rates.
In this respect, the conclusions from the ECB’s
assessment of its own monetary policy strategy in
2003 does not point to any substantial change in
behaviour in the future.A monetary relaxation rela-
tive to the United States is unlikely to happen before
there is a significant appreciation of the euro.
Different regions in the euro area may respond quite
differently to interest rate and exchange rate stimuli.
In some regions, cuts in interest rates per se may
bring little relief, unless they substantially affect the
exchange rate.
Conflicts over fiscal policy are a major concern in the
present situation. The failure of the Ecofin Council
to enforce the fiscal rules in the Treaty and in the
Stability and Growth Pact in November 2002 has
created a dangerous vacuum. There is a blatant dis-
crepancy between the legal rules in force and their
application – a discrepancy that undermines the
credibility of fiscal rules at the EU level and in the
long run threatens to undermine fiscal discipline.
In the 2003 EEAG report we presented a proposal
aimed at improving the Stability and Growth Pact.A
key ingredient of our proposal is to link the size of
maximum deficits to the stock of public debt. The
proposal also aims at reducing political conflicts of
interest in the enforcement of the rules by transfer-
ring the decisions on sanctions in the excessive
deficit procedure from the political level of the
Ecofin Council to the judicial level of the European
Court of Justice.
At the same time we proposed that the EU member
states should take steps to reform their national pro-
cedures for fiscal policy-making with the aim of both
strengthening the incentives for fiscal discipline and
improving the possibilities to use fiscal policy for sta-
bilisation purposes. A minimum requirement is to
institute a more transparent policy framework with




bilisation objectives as well as clear operating guide-
lines for how fiscal policy is to be used to smooth
cyclical fluctuations. As suggested in last year’s
EEAG report, one ingredient in such an institution-
al reform could be the establishment of an independ-
ent advisory Fiscal Policy Committee at the national
level. The committee could be given the task of
assessing the cyclical position of the economy and
the consistency of the budget balance with medium-
term objectives. The committee’s task would be to
make recommendations on the appropriate budget
balance and on specific tax and expenditure changes
to help stabilise the economy. If there were to be a
virtual breakdown of the common EU fiscal frame-
work, even more thorough-going reforms of nation-
al fiscal policy institutions might become desirable:
one radical reform would be to delegate the actual
decision-making regarding variations of actual bud-
get deficits or specific taxes around levels deter-
mined by the parliament to an independent Fiscal
Policy Committee.
Labour market reform in Europe (Chapter 2)
Because of political constraints, the margin of
manoeuvre for governments to combat unemploy-
ment with institutional reforms is typically quite nar-
row. In this chapter we first identify alternatives to
labour market reform that can reduce unemploy-
ment perhaps less efficiently but would encounter
less opposition. Second, we argue that present cir-
cumstances in Europe could make more radical
reforms possible in the near future,pointing out sev-
eral reasons why governments have become more
ambitious in this area.
An important alternative to labour market reform is
product market liberalisation. Increasing competi-
tion in product markets can have a strong beneficial
effect on the equilibrium rate of unemployment.This
is because more competition raises firms’ productiv-
ity and imposes discipline on pay setting, since it
reduces monopoly rents that are available to work-
ers.In Sweden,for example,aggressive product mar-
ket deregulation in the 1990s may have contributed
to the large fall in unemployment.
A second approach consists in eliminating inefficien-
cies in the welfare system without radical changes in
its basic structure. Relevant measures include the
following.
• Dismissal costs can be made more efficient in many
countries by replacing the current system of legal
procedures with a simple “firing tax” which would
be paid to the worker as severance payment.
• Incentives to work could be increased by replac-
ing means-tested welfare payments with in-work
benefits such as earned-income tax credits (a pro-
posal was presented in the 2002 EEAG report).
• Search activity of the unemployed should be
tightly monitored, with sanctions in the form of
reduced benefits if search is not active.However,
an open issue in this respect is how to make sure
that the unemployment insurance administra-
tion engages in effective monitoring and applies
sanctions.
Third, there are specific institutions or reforms that
may enhance convergence of the interests of employ-
ees (who do not profit from many reforms) and firms
(who gain from reforms). An important example is
provided by “profit sharing” and the promotion of
stock ownership among workers. These can make
policies of wage moderation, which boost profitabili-
ty and job creation, more acceptable to workers. If
adopted on a large scale, they can be an efficient
means of reducing equilibrium unemployment.A sec-
ond example is provided by recent reforms liberalis-
ing temporary employment contracts, which have
increased labour market flexibility in many European
countries. These reforms have met with much criti-
cism. For instance, it has been pointed out that the
reforms may increase the protection of permanent
workers.Yet,there has been substantial mobility from
temporary to permanent contracts in many countries,
and firms value temporary contracts as a way to test
the quality of new workers.
The experiences of the United Kingdom and, to a
lesser extent, Spain suggest that in situations per-
ceived as “crisis”, government can be more ambi-
tious in pushing reforms directly targeted at the
labour market. In principle, a critical point has also
been reached in a number of European countries,
not so much because of overall macroeconomic per-
formance (the current slowdown is milder than the
previous one), but because of budgetary problems
and the feeling that “globalisation” is making the
burden of labour rigidities unbearable.What are the
main factors that could promote,or delay,reforms in
the next few years?
First,paradoxically,the very efforts made by govern-
ments to combat unemployment tend to make it abigger problem, as they tend to increase social
spending per unemployed worker. Active labour
market policies in France and Sweden require con-
siderable spending per recipient. But in France they
have failed to produce a reduction in unemploy-
ment, and in Sweden their efficiency has been ques-
tion (one view is that they may have succeeded in
reducing registered unemployment,but at the cost of
lowering regular employment). Similarly, when high
persistent unemployment is erroneously fought
using fiscal and monetary policies, this leads to
excess deficits and/or inflation, which in the end cre-
ates the need for more drastic structural reforms.
Second, financial problems in other politically sensi-
tive areas,such as pensions and health care,raise the
social value of high employment rates. The recent
drive for labour market reform in Germany stems
from a more general crisis of the welfare state with
the recognition that the pre-reform state commit-
ments in this area are unsustainable. Opposition to
the removal of labour market rigidities weakened as
it became clear that failing to reform the labour mar-
ket would increase the need for reductions in pen-
sion and health insurance benefits that are more
valuable than the gains from existing rigidities.
Third, changes in the international economic envi-
ronment may raise the cost of labour market rigidi-
ties. Increasing openness reduces producers’ ability
to transfer changes in their labour costs to prices.
Since a faster pace of technical progress raises the
need for labour turnover, it penalises those societies
that impose a tax on turnover in the form of employ-
ment protection provisions. New technologies may
increase the demand for skilled workers and reduce
the demand for unskilled workers, thus reducing the
real wages and/or employment of the latter.
The reform package called “Agenda 2010” recently
adopted in Germany is a good illustration of these
effects. The reform was pushed forward because it
had become clear to the political elite of the country
that Germany’s welfare state was no longer afford-
able and proved incompatible with the degree of
wage flexibility required by globalisation. In addi-
tion to a large number of minor reforms,the package
abolishes the second-tier unemployment benefit sys-
tem, which used to pay roughly 60 percent of the
worker’s last net wage until retirement age. While
Agenda 2010 falls short of reforming the welfare sys-
tem and the system of wage bargaining,where major
reasons for the inflexibility of the German labour
market can be sought, it goes much further than
seemed possible only a year ago.The German exam-
ple is therefore a good illustration of how a severe
crisis and a sense of urgency enhance reform possi-
bilities and help to implement fundamental changes
that are otherwise politically doomed.
Pay-setting systems in Europe (Chapter 3)
Macroeconomic performance is also intimately asso-
ciated with the functioning of pay setting. It has
become commonplace to relate the rise in western
European unemployment in the 1970s and 1980s to
aggregate real wage rigidities. The reduction in
unemployment in many of the smaller EU countries
throughout the 1990s was associated with real wage
moderation. But in some countries a badly function-
ing pay-setting system has contributed to persistent
unemployment: in Germany, for instance, a crucial
problem has been the compression of pay differen-
tials between eastern and western Germany.
Another important aspect of pay setting relates to
the use of pay as an incentive to promote effort and
labour productivity. Increased international compe-
tition and new forms of work organisation have sub-
stantially increased the importance of this last aspect
of pay setting.
A key feature of pay-setting arrangements that is
common to most western European countries is the
high coverage of collective agreements, usually
above 60 percent of employees.The main exception
is the United Kingdom, where in 2001 the overall
coverage rate was estimated to be as low as 36 per-
cent. In most western European countries the main
bargaining level is the sectoral one. But the general
trend is toward enlarging the scope of local bargain-
ing. Somewhat paradoxically, in some countries this
development has occurred simultaneously with
social pacts between top level labour market organi-
sations, sometimes also involving governments, that
have set norms for pay increases at the national
level. In some EMU countries, such co-ordination
efforts have been a means to restrain wage increases.
The most far-reaching examples are Finland, Ireland
and the Netherlands, but less ambitious schemes
have also been adopted in Belgium, Greece and
Spain.
Most of the new EU member states in Eastern and
Central Europe find themselves in an entirely differ-




most of the acceding countries collective bargaining
is of much less importance than in Western Europe.
When collective bargaining does take place, the
main level is the enterprise one. Estonia, the Czech
Republic,Hungary,Latvia,Lithuania and Poland are
all characterised by decentralised pay bargaining at
the level of the enterprise and low unionisation and
coverage of collective agreements.
The forces behind the decentralisation of pay bar-
gaining in the past decades are likely to keep oper-
ating also in the future: one should expect further
decentralisation in western Europe. There are three
possible scenarios.
The first scenario is massive decentralisation, de-
unionisation and reduction in the importance of col-
lective bargaining, as has happened in the United
Kingdom, New Zealand and Australia. In these
countries, single-employer bargaining has almost
completely replaced multi-employer bargaining.The
Anglo-Saxon model of pay setting has its advan-
tages. The combination of enterprise-level bargain-
ing and low unionisation/coverage of collective
agreements is likely to produce aggregate real wage
restraint. At the same time, it promotes relative-
wage flexibility and the use of incentive pay. But the
radical change in pay-setting practices in the United
Kingdom, New Zealand and Australia have only
occurred following fundamental changes in the legal
system. Without sweeping legal reforms, a develop-
ment in this direction in continental western
European countries is unlikely.
The second scenario is a slow and disorgansed
process of decentralisation, leading to a reduction in
the importance of collective bargaining in Western
Europe.This has occured in eastern Germany,where
many firms have left the employers’ associations or
violated sectoral collective agreements in order to
reduce wage levels. However, because of the inertia
of wage-bargaining institutions, a process of sponta-
neous, disorganised decentralisation is likely to be
slow. In principle, decentralisation could promote
real wage restraint,although the effects might not be
large. But it is also possible that a move to single-
employer bargaining weakens the incentives for
wage restraint.This risk is actually great if coverage
of collective agreements and unionisation remain
high.
A third scenario is organised decentralisation,
according to which higher-level union confedera-
tions and employers’ associations choose voluntarily
to leave more scope for local bargaining. This could
involve larger freedom at the enterprise level to
determine the margin for wage increases and its dis-
tribution among individual employees.
Which pay-setting system should the EU countries
opt for? While there is no general answer to this
question,there are a few basic guidelines for reform.
We summarise them as follows:
• Pay-setting systems are very slow to change: it
takes a long time or extraordinary circumstances
to achieve fundamental changes. Therefore spe-
cific recommendations for individual countries
would have to take into account the existing bar-
gaining systems, which for historical reasons may
differ considerably among countries.
• There are good reasons for keeping existing bar-
gaining systems in those current EU member
states that have achieved wage restraint through
formal or informal co-ordination of bargaining at
the multi-sector level. Such arrangements have
worked well especially among smaller countries.
But aggregate real wage moderation should be
combined with relative wage flexibility. One way
to achieve this could be to publicise a “corridor”
for wage increases, rather than a single figure,
when wage norms are formulated.Alternatively,a
co-ordinated agreement on a “normal wage
increase” could be reached with the understand-
ing that “above-normal” wage raises should only
be granted in areas with labour shortages.
• The recommendation of allowing more relative
wage flexibility applies in particular to Germany,
where wage bargaining mostly takes place at the
sectoral level. In Germany, there is a strong need
for diversity in wages between the western and
the eastern regions, as well as for greater oppor-
tunities to set wages at the enterprise level that
are lower than the norms agreed upon at the sec-
toral level. If Germany’s stagnation problem is to
be solved, labour market reform must be extend-
ed to pay-setting practices as well, which so far
has not taken place.
• The acceding countries, with industrial relations
are of an Anglo-Saxon type (low unionisation,
low coverage of collective agreements,and collec-
tive bargaining at the level of the enterprise when
bargaining takes place) should keep their present
systems. These countries are likely to face strong
pressures from Western European trade unions,
and possibly also from EU institutions, to changetheir industrial relations systems so as to conform
better to “EU standards”. Such pressures should
be resisted. The existing combination of enter-
prise-level bargaining and limited importance of
collective agreements is likely to produce better
macroeconomic outcomes than a move to sec-
toral bargaining of the Western European
(German) type.
What will be the outcome of the present trend
towards greater importance of local-level pay setting
in Western European countries? For political and
economic reasons,it may turn out to be impossible to
combine aggregate real wage restraint with relative-
wage flexibility within the current bargaining sys-
tems. If this is the case, one cannot, in the long run,
rule out a development towards an Anglo-Saxon sys-
tem in which a move to single-employer collective
bargaining is accompanied by massive de-unionisa-
tion and a decline in the importance of collective
bargaining in general. But such a development
would probably occur only as a consequence of a
long period of deep economic crisis,followed by rad-
ical reform of basic labour legislation. This point is
underlined by the failure to include even modest
changes of the pay-setting system in the recently
adopted labour market reforms in Germany.
The economics of discrimination (Chapter 4) 
The draft of the European constitution asserts the
principle of non-discrimination as a fundamental
European value, to be explicitly written into the
constitution along with such values as pluralism,
tolerance, justice and solidarity. We fully share the
objectives of those who argue for measures against
discrimination: the elimination of racism, the
advancement of women in public and business life,
greater support of disabled people and the estab-
lishment of a true common market in which nation-
al origin ceases to be of economic relevance.But we
are concerned with the danger that the necessarily
pragmatic pursuit of policies to achieve these objec-
tives will be overtaken by the semantic interpreta-
tion of exactly what constitutes discrimination and
non-discrimination, if non-discrimination were to
be included as a general rule in the European cons-
titution.
The reality of this danger is illustrated by the experi-
ence of German reunification.In this case,the politi-
cal and constitutional imperatives of non-discrimina-
tion between the residents of the former eastern and
the residents of the former western provinces
required a common benefit system and common
labour regulation across areas at very different
stages of economic development.This both imposed
costly burdens and held back development in the
eastern states.
In this chapter, we examine the application of non-
discrimination rules in three broad areas of European
policy: gender discrimination in goods and services
(essentially in the insurance market); disability dis-
crimination and discrimination on grounds of nation-
ality.In each of these areas,policy effectiveness can be
much better achieved by careful analysis of costs and
benefits, and different policy trade-offs in relation to
objectives than by the legal application of general
principles which sound rhetorically attractive but
whose precise meaning and practical consequences
are often unclear and must necessarily be the subject
of future judicial determination.
In these and other areas covered by the proposed
anti-discrimination provisions we suggest that in
general the European constitution should contain
non-binding statements of objectives and give the
Commission and member states the responsibility of
introducing specific measures of implementation.
The confused and repetitive provisions of the draft
constitution dealing with non-discrimination, which
conflate a variety of policy issues into a single head-
ing,should be replaced by a declaratory statement of
the European Union’s objectives in these areas.Such
a statement would include a commitment to combat
racism, to promote the advancement of women in
business and public life,to give greater opportunities
to disabled people and to promote the free move-
ment of goods, services and people within the EU.
Where there are trade-offs to be made between
competing objectives or between different means of
achieving the same objectives – which is true in all
these cases – these trade-offs should be made
through the ordinary political processes rather than
by the courts,whose central but limited role in policy
should be the defence of the union’s fundamental
values and ensuring the propriety of its processes.
EU enlargement (Chapter 5)
EU enlargement in 2004 will most likely yield major
benefits to the new member countries in the long




from trade in goods and services and from a contin-
ued inflow of financial and real capital. Capital
inflows to these countries are already substantial, as
suggested by current account deficits in the order of
4 to 6 percent for the major ones. Most of these cap-
ital flows are in the form of direct investment from
present EU member countries. To a large extent
these flows respond to profit opportunities created
by the currently very low wages in acceding coun-
tries. While firms in the current EU member states
have already outsourced labour-intensive parts of
their product chains to Eastern Europe in the pre-
accession stage, outsourcing is likely to gain further
momentum after accession in 2004.
Without doubt, these processes will significantly
speed up economic growth in Eastern Europe.
However, even under optimistic assumptions, catch-
ing-up with the EU-15 countries will be a time-con-
suming process that will take at least several
decades.The crucial issue is the degree to which EU
membership will enhance economic growth in the
accession countries.Attracting private FDI will be a
key element of fast economic growth: preconditions
for further large FDI flows are well-functioning
goods and financial markets,an improved infrastruc-
ture and a high quality of public services.
The existing EU member countries will also partici-
pate in the gains from trade in the long run.
However, the internal adjustment processes caused
by enlargement may involve significant costs and
frictions in the short and medium term.In particular,
trade with acceding countries will increase down-
ward pressures on the wages of low-skilled workers.
Cuts in pre-tax real wages for this group may
become necessary to prevent a further increase in
unemployment rates and an excessive dismantling of
labour-intensive production,yet such cuts will be dif-
ficult to implement. In chapters 2 and 3 of this
report, we discuss reforms of labour market institu-
tions that would enhance wage flexibility.As regards
pay-setting practices, for instance, such reforms
should entail measures to promote relative-wage
flexibility among sectors, regions, and occupations.
But policy priority should also be given to specific
measures to combine wage flexibility with socially
acceptable standards of living for low-wage employ-
ees.The first EEAG report (EEAG 2002) suggested
a system of social assistance according to which low-
wage incomes from employment could be topped up
with employment tax credits that would generate the
necessary pre-tax wage differentials while prevent-
ing socially undesirable declines in the living stan-
dards of low-skilled workers.
The economic consequences of EU enlargement will
also depend on the policies pursued by the new
members. Acceding countries currently have fairly
delicate macroeconomic situations. Many of them
have significant public sector deficits. Even if the
stocks of public debt are low or moderate, sustain-
ability of public finances can become a major policy
concern.
There are a number of potentially positive fiscal
effects from EU membership, including significant
transfers from the EU and indirect gains from interest
rate convergence and higher growth rates. These
effects notwithstanding, the new EU members are
likely to face pressures on public spending after acces-
sion: the countries will have to co-finance EU-funded
projects, and the implementation of EU regulations
will entail fiscal costs. Improvement of the infrastruc-
ture as well as social insurance reform and educa-
tion,will be additional major items in public spending.
In many accession countries, high unemployment
rates imply that there is significant underutilisation
of resources. At best, these resources can provide
further impetus for rapid economic growth, but they
could also feed major labour migration to the EU-15
countries.Migratory pressure is likely to be felt most
strongly in Germany and Austria, countries that are
geographically close to the new members.
EU membership and fully open borders will gradu-
ally lead to industrial changes as well.The decline of
manufacturing in the Baltic and Central and Eastern
European accession countries throughout the 1990s
has been reversed in recent years.Some manufactur-
ing sectors have recovered and are likely to keep
expanding in the future. Significant parts of the rela-
tively low-skill manufacturing industry and services
may gradually shift from EU-15 to the new member
countries.
Agricultural productivity is quite low in the acceding
countries and there is significant potential for
improvement. Agricultural and food production are
likely to increase in some of these countries, though
food safety and other regulations could contain the
rate of expansion. An important role in shaping the
future of the agriculture and food processing indus-
try in Europe will be played by international WTO
negotiations.The road to the euro (Chapter 6)
The ten EU accession countries are supposed to join
EMU in the next few years – the third and last phase
of accession. Participation in EMU is conditional on
satisfying the convergence criteria established in the
Maastricht Treaty. When should these countries
adopt the new currency? What are the challenges to
policymakers in the period between EU accession
and the adoption of the euro?
There are clear benefits from participating in EMU.
The traditional argument is the credibility of low
inflation, which applies to acceding countries as it
did to southern European countries in the 1990s.A
common currency eliminates currency risk and
therefore drastically reduces interest rate differen-
tials. In addition, a common currency is likely to
increase trade with other EU countries. In this
respect, adopting the euro is equivalent to a drop in
transaction costs in cross-border exchanges of goods
and services within the EU economic area.Also, by
reducing the stock of external debt denominated in
foreign currency, adopting the euro will substantial-
ly reduce vulnerability to currency and financial
instability (although in principle EMU countries
could still issue large stocks of dollar-denominated
debt). The main and well-known disadvantage of
participation in a monetary union is the loss of
national monetary policy as an instrument of macro-
economic stabilisation and of the exchange rate as
an adjustment mechanism.Whether and under what
circumstances the adoption of the euro is a net eco-
nomic benefit is the subject of an ongoing academic
debate and political discussion in present EU coun-
tries that are not members of EMU. However, from
a political point of view it appears certain that the
accession countries will ultimately join EMU, so the
relevant policy issue is one of timing.
The road to EMU may be quite difficult. Policy
choices on the timing of EMU participation directly
impinge on the acceding countries’ ability to use
monetary policy to stabilise their economies in the
next few years and to build an economic environ-
ment that favours high rates of investment and
growth, economic integration and financial stability.
Fiscal and monetary authorities in the acceding
countries now operate in a regime of high capital
mobility. This is the result of a relatively rapid
process of liberalisation and deregulation imple-
mented in the last few years.But it is too early to say
whether or not the financial and legal systems of
these countries can weather volatile capital move-
ments. However, it would be naïve to hope for the
better and envision years without large (global or
region-specific) shocks.
Our last chapter points at the intrinsic financial and
currency fragility of fast-growing emerging markets
in a world of liberalised capital flows. Based on the
experience of the 1990s, emerging markets may be
exposed to highly volatile capital flows,which can be
a formidable challenge to macroeconomic stability.
In boom periods, large inflows of short-term capital
lead to domestic overheating and high rates of
domestic credit expansion, causing excessive risk
taking. Since debt is usually denominated in foreign
currency, these inflows also expose domestic institu-
tions and individuals to severe currency risk. In bust
periods, currency devaluation worsens the balance
sheets of banks and production firms.
EU accession is likely to increase short-term specu-
lative capital inflows into the acceding countries.
These flows may also respond to moral hazard dis-
tortions at both domestic and euro-area levels.
Vulnerability to crises and contagion emphasises the
need for building well-established mechanisms at the
EU level to deal with such contingencies.
As discussed in Chapter 5, structural imbalances in
the acceding economies may cause acute problems.
Deteriorating fiscal conditions could constrain the
use of budget policies for stabilisation purposes.
Stabilisation is likely to fall disproportionately on
monetary and financial authorities, both from a
macro perspective and from a financial stability per-
spective. In such an environment, mandatory adop-
tion of a regime of limited exchange rate flexibility
(ERM II) for two years before entering EMU is con-
troversial.
Overall, there is no single strategy that may be rec-
ommended to all acceding countries as regards
macroeconomic stabilisation on the road to the euro.
Arguments in favour of adopting the euro as early as
possible includes smaller financial risk due to the
elimination of currency mismatch in the balance
sheets of banks and firms (which implies the risk of a
self-fulfilling run on the country’s debt); interest rate
convergence (with the associated gains in terms of the
interest bill for the government as well as investment
financing by firms); and overall gains in monetary




include the need to remove financial distortions cre-
ating moral hazard and therefore raising the country’s
default risk; easier relative-price adjustment without
the need of costly nominal wage and price adjust-
ments; and the need to make fiscal and financial poli-
cy sustainable and compatible with a fixed exchange
rate before participation in the EMU.
The following recommendations may be made, how-
ever:
• Countries that are already able to sustain hard
pegs should be helped to achieve a smooth and
fast transition to the euro. In this set of countries,
mainly small ones, priority should be given to
institutional reforms and building a policy frame-
work consistent with participation in the euro
area without suffering from major macroeconom-
ic imbalance.
• Delaying participation in ERM II is a realistic
option for countries that are currently unable to
sustain hard pegs and have large domestic imbal-
ances. Here the policy priority is achieving a sus-
tainable fiscal stance and stabilising inflation at
the correct relative prices.This task requires both
institutional and policy reform.
• For both groups of countries,the convergence cri-
teria in terms of inflation, interest rates, debt and
deficits provide desirable targets to guide policy
and should not be relaxed. Though they are not
first-best targets, these convergence criteria
should be judged relative to existing distortions
that could derail the stabilisation efforts.
• ERM II allows for large fluctuation bands around
the exchange rate parity.Once in the ERM,a coun-
try should be able to use the exchange rate flexibil-
ity implied by such an arrangement: exchange rate
stability should not be mechanically assessed with
reference to much narrower bands. Fluctuations in
the exchange rate in response to domestic and for-
eign shocks are not necessarily an indicator of ten-
sion in the foreign exchange market, but can be
part of an efficient adjustment process.If the dollar
suffers further depreciation,it would be reasonable
to expect exchange rate fluctuations within ERM
II.Declaring that acceding countries will be accept-
ed in the euro area only if they can peg to the euro
within narrow bands may raise the possibility of
speculative attacks driven by self-fulfilling prophe-
cies.During the transition to the euro,strict domes-
tic stabilisation with some exchange rate flexibility
is better than exchange-rate based stabilisation
with very limited flexibility.